




















long-term	exposure	 to	 toxic	 substances:	 providing	 evidence	of	 causation	 and	 negligence.	 This	 post	 deals	with	 the	 former
issue	(causation),	while	another	will	be	dedicated	to	the	latter.	After	a	summary	of	the	main	di culties	in	providing	proof	of






victim’s	disease	was	 exposure	 to	 a	 certain	 toxic	 substance.	Even	when	 conclusive	 scienti c	 evidence	 from	 toxicological	 or
epidemiologic	studies	indicate	that	the	substance	is	capable	of	causing	that	category	of	disease	(the	general	causation	issue),
it	is	often	extremely	di cult,	if	not	impossible,	to	conclude	that	the	substance	is	the	but-for	cause	of	that	particular	victim’s
disease	 (the	 speci c	 causation	 issue).	 This	 situation,	 often	 de ned	 by	 toxic	 tort	 scholars	 as	 the	 “indeterminate	 plainti ”














either,	 as	 it	 would	 require	 particularistic	 evidence	 of	 the	 role	 of	 asbestos	 in	 that	 particular	 victim’s	 case;	 unfortunately,
current	scienti c	knowledge	does	not	allow	us	to	gather	such	evidence.	There	are	numerous	other	similar	cases	of	exposure	to














often	the	main	source	of	evidence	 for	general	causation	 in	 toxic	cases.	As	mentioned	above,	 they	can	reliably	demonstrate
whether	a	certain	substance	is	toxic	or	 innocuous	to	human	beings.	For	 instance,	 in	observational	cohort	studies	scientists
verify	whether	individuals	exposed	to	a	certain	substance	(X)	develop	a	certain	disease	(D)	at	a	higher	rate	than	those	who	are
not	exposed;	if	so,	and	if	the	excess	rate	of	diseases	in	the	observed	population	cannot	be	explained	by	causes	other	than	X,
then	X	can	be	considered	a	 risk	 factor	 for	D[5].	 This	 is	 how,	 for	 example,	 scientists	Richard	Doll	 and	Austin	Bradford	Hill

















virtually	 certain	 that	 there	 are	 thirty	 deaths	 in	 excess	 which	 would	 not	 have	 occurred	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 exposure	 to
asbestos[6].	 In	 epidemiology,	 this	measure	 is	 called	“attributable	number”,	which	 is	 de ned	 as	«the	 excess	 caseload	of	 a
speci c	outcome	attributable	to	an	exposure	over	a	de ned	time	period»[7].
Whenever	evidence	of	an	attributable	number	is	available,	the	court	(either	civil	or	criminal)	can	come	to	the	conclusion	that
the	 exposure	 has	 caused	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 victims	 (in	 our	 example,	 30	 individuals).	 However,	 in	 the	 absence	 of
particularistic	evidence,	the	same	court	cannot	pinpoint	who,	among	the	a ected	persons	(in	our	example,	40	individuals),
fell	 ill	due	 to	 the	exposure	and	 is	part	of	 the	excess	quota	 (30	 individuals)	and	who	would	have	 fallen	 ill	 even	without	 the
exposure	as	part	of	the	background	risk	quota	(10	individuals)[8].


















to	 the	community	of	plainti s»[10].	 Taking	 inspiration	 from	a	 ground-breaking	 article	 by	David	Rosenberg	 published	 the
same	year[11],	Weinstein	imagined	that	the	phase	dedicated	to	assessing	the	defendant’s	liability	could	be	separated	from	the
subsequent	phase	dedicated	to	quantifying	each	plainti ’s	redress:	the	former	phase	could	well	be	based	on	epidemiological
evidence	 alone,	 because	 its	 purpose	 would	 be	 «to	 hold	 a	 defendant	 liable	 for	 no	 more	 than	 the	 aggregate	 loss	 fairly




For	 example,	 Weinstein	 hypothesised	 a	 scenario	 where	 an	 epidemiological	 study	 among	 the	 people	 exposed	 to	 the
defendant’s	toxic	agent	had	found	1,100	cases	of	cancer	 instead	of	the	1,000	expected	cases.	 In	this	 instance	the	defendant
could	be	held	liable	for	injury	to	a	total	of	100	people,	i.e.	the	excess	rate	of	cancers	found	by	the	epidemiologic	investigation.
Since	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 100	 individuals	 injured	 could	 not	 be	 known,	Weinstein	 devised	 the	 following	mechanism	 for	 the
distribution	of	the	redress:	one	had	to	quantify	the	value	of	a	standard	injury	(say	1	million	dollars),	multiply	this	value	by	the
total	number	of	injuries	in	excess	(100	in	this	case)	and	then	divide	the	total	amount	(100	million	dollars)	by	the	number	of












Italian	 cases	 (Eternit,	 Ilva	 and	 Tirreno	 Power)	 adopted	 an	 approach	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Weinstein.	 In	 all	 three	 cases




Instead	 of	 charging	 the	 companies’	managers	with	 negligent	 homicide	 and	 injury	–	 as	 had	 been	 the	 case	 in	 all	 previous
Italian	 toxic	cases	–	prosecutors	chose	 to	charge	 them	with	o ences	against	public	 safety,	 in	particular	 those	provided	by
articles	434	and	449	of	the	Italian	penal	code.	Article	434	is	at	the	end	of	a	list	of	o ences	against	public	safety	–	causing	 res,
railway	disasters,	landslides	etc.	– 	and	punishes	the	voluntary	causation	of	"any	other	disaster";	article	449	extends	liability




disaster”	also	 encompassed	 the	 excess	 rate	of	diseases	 and	deaths	highlighted	by	 the	 epidemiologic	 studies	 conducted	on
workers	and	residents	near	the	facilities.	In	other	words,	the	Court	indicated	that	epidemiologic	evidence	can	be	used	to	prove
the	existence	of	a	sort	of	«epidemic	phenomenon»	attributable	to	exposure	to	the	risk	factor.	A	similar	approach	was	adopted
by	 the	 judge	 for	 the	preliminary	 investigation	 in	 the	Tirreno	Power	case.	When	explaining	 the	reasons	 for	seizing	 the	coal






the	 resulting	 harm	 to	 human	 beings.	 Determining	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 disaster	 was	 particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	 Eternit	 case
because	 the	o ence	provided	by	article	434	 is	 limited	 to	a	maximum	of	 15	years	after	 the	event:	according	 to	 the	Court	of
Appeals,	since	the	excess	rate	of	diseases	and	premature	deaths	was	an	ongoing	phenomenon	at	the	time	of	the	indictment,










describe	 the	 speci city	 of	 the	 attributable	 number,	 i.e.	 a	 collective	 damage	 which	 can	 be	 seen	 only	 through	 the	 lens	 of
epidemiologic	investigations,	from	a	legal	standpoint.








Focusing	our	attention	on	 the	European	scenario,	 there	are	at	 least	 two	reasons	why	criminal	 lawyers	should	consider	 the
attributable	number	.
The	 rst	reason	is	grounded	in	the	Environmental	Crime	Directive	(2008/99/EC).	According	to	article	3	(a),	(b),	(d)	and	(e)	of














take	measures	that	would	have	averted	it	(Öneryildiz	v.	Turkey,	§	93;	Brincat	v.	Malta,	§	 121).	Now	 imagine	 that	an	o cial
















respectively.	 After	 all,	 why	 should	 a	 conduct	 consisting	 of	 causing	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 unidenti ed	 victims	 be	 treated
di erently	 than	 a	 conduct	 consisting	 of	 causing	 the	 same	 number	 of	 identi ed	 ones?	 Compliance	 with	 the	 “beyond	 any
reasonable	 doubt”	 rule,	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 speci c	 causation,	 would	 be	 assured	 by	 testing	 the	 reliability	 of	 the
epidemiologic	study	which	provides	the	“attributable	number”	measure.	To	that	end,	the	fact	 nder	could	use	the	ordinary




o ences	against	 the	person	does	not	necessarily	 require	 the	 identi cation	of	 the	victim,	 then	 in	order	 to	 comply	with	 the
aforementioned	obligations	of	criminalization,	the	solution	is	the	introduction	of	an	o ence	speci cally	designed	to	sanction











of	 speci c	 causation	because	 it	does	not	 reveal	who	 the	 victims	 are.	As	 a	 consequence,	 there	may	be	 situations	where	 the
defendant	 cannot	 be	 held	 accountable,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 an	 incontrovertible	 fact	 that	 he/she	 caused	 a	 certain	 number	 of
diseases	or	deaths.
This	post	has	highlighted	some	of	the	strategies	adopted	in	attempting	to	overcome	this	obstacle,	from	that	suggested	in	the
U.S.	 Agent	Orange	 case	 to	 the	 ones	 proposed	 by	 Italian	 prosecutors	 in	 the	 Eternit,	 Ilva	 and	Tirreno	 Power	 criminal	 cases.
Leaving	aside	 the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	 the	mentioned	cases,	and	considering	 the	provisions	of	 the	Environmental




































[14]	 Predominance	 is	 among	 the	 conditions	 provided	 by	 Rule	 23(b)(3)	 of	 the	U.S.	 Federal	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	 for	 the
certi cation	of	the	“damage	class	action”.
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